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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

MLPH LEROY MENZIES,

Case No. 16324

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, appeals from the
conviction of the crime of Aggravated Robbery in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, was found guilty
by a jury before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , Judge

presiding, of the crime of Aggravated Robbery on February 6th,
1979, and was thereafter sentenced to be committed to the Utah

State Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law.
~

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a dismissal.
ln

ther alternative counsel seeks to have the matter remanded to

"he court and a new trial ordered in the above entitled matter.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the evening of the 17th day of July, 1978,
a Valfoa Lealaitafea was driving a taxi during the course of
his regular employment.

He stopped at a location on approximately

Fourth East and Seventh South, in Salt Lake City, to pick up
a fare.

A person got into his taxi and shortly thereafter

pulled or produced a weapon which he pointed at Mr. Lealaitafea.
The victim, Mr. Lealaitafea, subsequently identified
the defendant, Ralpy Leroy Menzies, as the person who he picked
up in his cab on that occassion.

According to Mr. Lealaitafea's

testimony, he was asked to turn over his money, and that he did
so while the gun was pointed at

him.

After giving up most of

his money, Mr. Lealaitafea attempted to grab the gun, at which
point it went off, severly injuring his arm.

The perpetrator of

the crime left the taxi and escaped on foot.
~Vhile

he was recuperating from his injury sustained

in the robbery, the victim was shown a photographic array on
two occassions.

On the first of the two occassions, he selected

the picture of the defendant, Ralph Leroy Menzies, as being
someone who had a similar hair style.

On the second occassion,

he was once again shown a photographic array, which contained
a picture of the defendant, and on that occassion he selected
the picture of the defendant as the person who committed the crime
Subsequent to the two photographic identifications, the victim
made several in court identifications of the defendant, Ralph
Leroy Menzies.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was arrested on an unrelated charge.

Following his arrest

he was confined for a period in the Salt Lake County Jail.
The State called Louis Jaramillo to the stand and he testified
that on the holiday weekend, just before the twenty-fourth of
July, he had the occassion to meet Mr. Menzies in jail.(R. 136)
He further stated that during the period thatthey occupied the
same cell together that he had occassion to talk to Mr. Menzies,
and that Mr. Menzies stated that he had been involved in a robbery
wherein a Samoan or Tongan cab driver had been robbed, and that
he had had to "blow him away". (R. 138)
Detective William L. Abbott, police officer for
Salt Lake City Police Department, testified that he had on two
occassions showed photographs to the victim and that both of
those photographic arrays included photographs of the Appellant,
Ralph Leroy Menzies.

Detective Abbott testified that on the

first occassion the victim picked out the photograph of Ralph
Leroy Menzies, but said only that the victim looked similar in
some ways to the person who committed the crime, and that he
had had similar hair and face.

The Detective stated that the

victim did not identify Mr. Menzies' photograph on that occassion.
(R. 153)

Detective Abbott testified that he took approximately

seven photographs on that first occassion from a bulletin board
which included ten or twelve photographs, and further, that he
had not retained those photographs, and didn't remember which
individual's pictures were involved infue first array.
Detective Abbott further stated that on the second
occassion, the victim did make a positive identification of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Detective Abbott stated that the second photographic array
contained only one picture that had also appeared in the first
photographic array, and that picture was the picture of Ralph
Leroy Menzies, the Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO RECEIVE
THE IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT BY THE
VICTIM VALFOA LEALAITAFEA TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY
The appellant moved for suppression of the identification
made by the victim in court and elsewhere based on the prejudice
resulting from bias and prejudicial photographic arrays shown
to the victim at an earlier time.

A hearing on the appellant's

motion was held before the Honorable David K. Winder on
October 18, 1978.

Following a hearing on the motion the court

denied the defendant's motion to suppress the identification
and allowed an in court identification by the victim to occur.
During the course of the motion to suppress the identification
counsel for the appellant called to the stand Detective Abbott
who testified that on two occasions he showed photographic
arrays to the victim in connection with this case.

The victim

failed to make any identification on the first occasion but did
identify a photograph of the defendant on the second occasion.
Detective Abbott testified that on the first occasion
he showed to the victim a total of seven photographs.

Included

in that group of photographs was a photograph of the defendant.
The detective selected the phptographs to be shown to the victim
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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board of the Detective Division.

(T.l71-2)

The detective

stated that he did not save the array of photographs that he
used on that occasion, that he did not remember whose photograph
were included other than the photograph of the appellant and one
John Sloan, that he did not recall the appearance of the remaining
individuals beyond the fact that they were white males
similar hair (T.l64).

with

On that occasion the victim made no

identification from the photo array, but indicated that there
was something familiar about the photograph of Ralph Menzies.
(T.l75)

Detective Abbott then returned all of the photographs

to the bulletin board from once they came, there exists no record
of those photographs, who those photographs were of or where
those photographs went following the showing to the victim in this
case.
Approximately two weeks later Detective Abbott provided
the victim with a second group of photographs.

On this occasion

there were eight photographs which the detective preserved after
the photographic array.

(T.l77)

On the second occasion these

photographs were drawn from a group of approximately 200 photographs
and were picked by the detective to represent similar individuals.
<

So far as the detective was able to say only one of the photographs
from the first line-up reappeared in the second photo array and
that was the photograph of Ralph Menzies, the appellant.

(T.l79)

On this occasion the victim identified the photograph of Mr. Menzies
as being the person who had robbed him.
The victim subsequently appeared in court and identified
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subsequent trials.

It is the appellant's contention that based

on the prejudice surrounding the exhibition of photographs that
at the photographic identification on the occasion of the showing
of the second photographic array should be suppressed and that
the subsequent in court identification should be suppressed as
well, for the reason that they are based on and stem from
the original prejudicial photographic array.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the issue
of identification from photo arrays in the case of Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 1967, 19 L.Ed. 2d 1247 (1968).
While the court in that case approved of the photographic line-up
procedure,the court also pointed to significant potential dangers
in the use of such photographic arrays.

As the court stated

in that opinion.
"It must be recognized that improper employment of photographs
by police may sometimes cause witnesses to err in
identifying criminals. A witness may have obtained only
a brief glimpse of a criminal, or may have seen him under
poor conditions. Even if the police subsequently follow
the most correct photographic identification procedures
and show him the pictures of a number of individuals without
indicating whom they suspect, there is some danger that
the witness may make an incorrect identification. This
danger will be increased if the police display to the
witness only the picture of a single individual who generally
resembles the person he saw, or if they show him the
pictures of several persons among which the photograph of a
single such individual recurs~or is in some way
emphasized. The chance of misidentification is also
heightened if the police indicate to the witness that they
have other evidence that one of the persons pictures
committed the crime. Regardless of how the initial
misidentification comes about, the witness thereafter is
apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph
rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the
trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom
identification.
(Italics added)
390 U.S. at 383.

Subsequent to the Simmons case Utah State Supreme Court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48 492 P.2d 1349
. . . the circumstances of the individual case should
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court to see
whether in the identification procedures there was
anything done that should be regarded as so suggestive
or persuasive that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the identification was not a genuine product
of the knowledge and recollection of the witness, but
was something so distorted or tainted that in fairness
and justness the guilt or innocence of an accused
should not be allowed to be tested thereby.
The Utah Supreme Court once again approved of police procedure
involving a state line-up in the case of State v. Wettstein,
28 Utah 2d 295, 501 P.2d 1084 (1972) holding in that particular
case:
There was substantial, confident evidence to support
the determination of the trial court that the identification
testimony had an independent source. Id. supra at page 297
More recently in the case of State v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d
1232 (1974), the Utah Supreme Court had occasion to once again
app.rove the use of photographs but once again acknowledging
the necessity that the photographic presentation be fair and
impartial.

Quoting from Justice Crockett's opinion in that

case at page 1233:
It is true that either procedure (line-up or photographic
arrays) is subject to being used either fairly or
unfairly. The desirable objective and the requirement
is that the identification shQuld be conducted in a fair,
reasonable and impartial manner with a view to
protecting the innocent and finding the guilty.
(Parenthesis added and footnotes omitted).
Other courts have examined the appropriateness of photographic
arrays since the Simmons case cited supra. While the courts have
generally found police procedure within acceptable guidelines,
on several occasions various courts have found that photographic
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testimony was suppressed.

In the case of United States v. Sanders,

479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973)

pre~trial

identification evidence

was suppressed where a photo display in which the defendant was
the only one with facial hair and a stout appearance was followed
by a line-up at which the defendant was the only one repeated
from the photograph.

The Third Circuit disapproved of eye-witness

testimony in a case where a witness was asked to pick the photo
of the person who looked "most like" the individual who committed
the crime from a group of photos containing other individuals
who were much younger and did not resemble the defendant.

United

States v. Keller, 512 F.2d 182 (1975).
Appellant suggests that the fundamental unfairness of the
pre-trial photographic identification made of the defendant falls
into the category of a police procedure which has a substantial
risk of leading to the eventual mis-identification of a suspect
in court.

The appellant further suggests that it was precisely

that kind of inappropriate, biased presentation in the form of a
photo array to the victim in this case that lead to the identificatior.
of the appellant.

The police procedure in the above entitled

case was not in many cases upheld

b~

this court and other anpellate

courts a simple matter of showing to a victim of an alleged crime
several photographs of a similar nature to determine if the victim
would select any one of the photographs as the perpetrator of the
crime.

Rather it must be remembered that in this case the police

showed two sets of photographs to the victim.

Only one of which

photographs appeared in both photographic arrays and that was the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

photograph of the
defendant.
Library Services
and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

To further compound the unfairness of the procedure the
police officer who showed the test failed to preserve the photographs
from the initial photographic showing.

Because of his actions

the trial court as well as the appellate court will never be able
to detect the potential bias and suggestiveness of that first
photo array since it can never be reconstructed.

However,

it may be assumed from the officer's testimony that the seven
photographs were selected from approximately 12 that the range
of characteristics in terms of hair, facial hair, skin coloration,
facial structure, etc. was very wide and that the selection of the
photographs for that initial show-up did not provide a neutral
setting for the display of the photograph of the appellant,
who was at that time a suspect.
Further from the detective's testimony at the hearing to
suppress the identification we know that as well as the victim's
testimony at trial, we know that he was unable to identify the
man who robbed him from that first set of photographs, which
according to all accounts contained the photograph of the:,appellant.
It was not until the occasion of the second photographic array
that the victim identified the appellant's picture.
identification occurred from a

grou~

That

of photographs which contained

only one photo in common with the earlier show-up.

The factual

situation presented here is much similar to the case of United
States v. Sanders, supra wherein the court held that a line-up
at which the defendant was the only person repeated from the earlier
photographic array violated due process and suppressed testimony
regarding the pre-trial identifications.

Appellant suggests that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the photographic identification and the subsequent in-court
identification based on the earlier identification was a
violation of due process in two respects.

First the pre-trial

identification occurred as the victim was observing the second
set of photographs which set contained only one photograph from
the first array and that was the picture of the defendant, that
itself is highly suggestive creating a potential hazar for
misidentification.
Secondly, the destruction of the photos from the fist
photographic show-up prevents review either by the trial court
or by the appellat court of any potential biases, inaccuracies
or suggestiveness of that initial line-up.

As the court said

in Simmons at page 384:
" . . . We hold that each case must be considered on its
own facts, and that convictions based on eye-witness
identification at trial following a pre-trial identification
by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if
a photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification."
The appellant in this case has been deprived of the right
to have that matter determined at a trial court by virtue of the
police officer's destruction of these photographs upon which
subsequent identifications are

bas~.

To allow such and

identification stand would be to say to police officer that the cure
for a biased and suggestive photographic array would be simple
destruction of the photographs following the showing to the victim o;
witnesses.

If such behavior were condoned by the courts it would be

mandate that constitutionally improper photo show-ups could be cured
the simple destruction of the evidence that would have showed its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitutional infirmity.
The potentially favorable nature of the evidence from the
missing photographs is apparent.

The photos themselves could

show clearly the broad variety and suggestive nature of the
photographs on their face.

No amount of testimony or analysis

after the fact in the absence of those photographs could adequately
capture the bias and suggestive nature for the jury as well as
for the court.
Several general rules have been developed in the area of
suppression of favorable evidence.

The Utah Supreme Court in

State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975), announced the rule
governing nondisclosure of evidence favorable and material to
criminal defendants:
(S)uppression or destruction of evidence by those
charged with prosecution, including police officers,
constitutes a denial of due process if the evidence
is material to guilt or innocence of the defendant in
a criminal case. . . "
0

0

Id. at 478.
The rule in Stewart is even broader in scope than that of
the leading United States Supreme Court case in the field of
suppression of evidence, BFady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.

2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), in which the Court said:

"
"We now hold that the suppression
by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution."
~-

373 U.S. at 870
Stewart's extension of the duty to disclose to police officers

has also been approved by the United States Supreme Court in
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2d 104, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972):
"Horeover, whether the nondisclosure was a result of
negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the
prosecutor. The prosecutor's office is an entity
and as such it is the spokesman for the Government."
Id. 405 U.S. at 154.
to disclose, the

If the police were not burdened with a duty

~rosecutor

could successfully claim that police

officers, who did the principle investigation of a case, had
withheld exculpatory information from him, and, therefore, that
he had no duty to disclose the material.

This would leave the

defendant with no assertable claim when his right to a fair trial
had been clearly abridged.

To impede due process disclosure in

this fashion 'lvould effectively abrogate the fundamental fairness
objectives sought by the many constitutional decisions requiring
disclosure of favorable and material evidence to the defendant.
For this reason,
" . . . The police are also part of the prosecution,
and the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather
than the State's Attorney, were guilty of nondisclosure."

****************** ****** **
"The duty to disclose is that of the state, which
ordinarily acts through the prosecuting attorney; but
if he too is the victim of police suppression of the
material information, the state's failure is not on
that account excused. We cannot condone an atte~pt to
connect the defendant with ths crime by questionable
inferences which might be refuted by undisclosed and
unproduced documents in the hands of the police."
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964).
The destruction of evidence case is akin to the above
analysis.

The Utah

Supre~e

Court has not dealt with this exact

situation, but in State v. Stewart, 554 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975) our
Court did deal with a problem similar in nature.

In that case,
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the defendant was convicted of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled
Substance and during the trial there was evidence presented that
the undercover agent who purchased the narcotics had a tape recorder
on his person during the transaction.

That tape was requested

during the trial by defense counsel and the request was denied.
In ruling on that contention our Court said that:
"Hhile it is true that a deliberate suppression or
destruction of evidence by those charged with the
prosecution, including police officers, constitutes
a denial of due process if the evidence is material to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a criminal
case, there is no showing in this case that the
material recorded on the tape in question was vital
to the issue of whether or not the defendant was guilty
of the charge."
This was so, the court held, because the defendant specifically
denied having made the sale and denied even having seen the
undercover witness on the day the sale was supposedly to have
occurred.

Our court issued guidance in that case when it said:

"We think it advisable that those charged with investigation
and prosecution of crime retain intact all records and other
evidence pertaining to the case until it is finally disposed
of. By adopting such a practice, a claim of unfairness by
one charged with a criminal offense would be groundless."
Thus, our court has recognized that a destruction of evidence
that is material to guilt or
of law.

innoce~ce

is a denial of due process

In that case, however, there was no showing the tape would

have been beneficial.

The defendant there denied completely even

having met the undercover agent on the date in question.
this case, the simplicity

In

of the preservation of the photos in the

original photographic show-up, as well as the importance of that
evidence to show subsequent identification bias dictate that the failure
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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remedies sought by the defendant.
In this case, of course, defendant has not shown that the
evidence would have been favorable to him.

Such a burden and task

under the circumstances is obviously completely impossible as the
evidence has been destroyed.

Defendant contends that he need not

"prove" the material would be favorable to him as he would in a
situation where there was evidence merely suppressed, but not destrov,
In State v. Brewer, 549 P.2d 188 (Ariz. App. 1976), the Court
dealt with a conviction in a fraud case.

The defendant alleged that

certain evidence was destroyed prior to the trial which may have tendl
to establish his innocence.

The Court examined that contention and

noted that the destroyed documents had been transcribed and that
transcript had been made available to the defendant.

The court

in discussing the destruction of evidence said that to be in
violation of due process;
"The State must know, or have reason to know, that the
evidence being destroyed was either material or favorable
to the accused."
Thus, in that case, there was no required shmving that the material
be favorable if it was destroyed.

It would be enough if the

defendan~

could show either that it was material or favorable and that the
State knew or had reason to know of that materiality.

Defendant

submits that the very nature of_the evidence in question must lead
the court to the conclusion that the State through its' agent knew
that the results of the photographic array (where identification
is a crucial element of the offense) would be material.

This is the

case, the defendant contends, where as the court said in In Re
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"The police or prosecution may disable the State from
ever giving a defendant a fair trial if they have lost or
destroyed or otherwise made unavailable vital defense
evidence."
In Cameron, the California Court noted that if such a situation arose,
a new trial should not be held, but the defendant should be discharged.
The State of Washington dealt with a similar case in State
v. Wright, 557 P. 2d 1 (Hash 1976).

In that case the defendant

was convicted of First Degree Murder for the killing of his wife.
Her badly decomposed body was found in a room and had apparently been

k dead for approximately 3 weeks.

After removing all of the clothing

from the body, due to its' highly infected and unpleasant nature,
the police burned all clothing before any analysis for blood or any
other tests were performed.

The police gave permission to a relative

of the deceased to remove and burn the bedding and mattresses and
other items from the room.

This was all accomplished before the defendant:

had been appointed an attorney but after he was arrested and before
any scientific tests of any kind were performed.

In that case,

the defendant prior to trial made a motion to dismiss the charge
on the basis of a denial of due process of law.

The court began

by discussing "what is material" and reached the inescapable
~

conclusion that such evidence could have been material, but that
it lvas impossible to tell 111hether or not the evidence would be
favorable to the defendant because it had been destroyed.

The court

quoted a leading case in the area, United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d
~42 (D.C.

Car. 1971).

The Washington Court quoted as follows:
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"The purpose of the duty [to disclose] is not simply to
correct an imbalance of advantage whereby the prosecution
may surprise the defense at trial with new evidence;
rather, it is also to make of the trial a search for
truth informed by all relevant material, much of which
because of imabalance in investigative resources, will
be exclusively in the hands of the government."
Further, quoting from Bryant, the Court said that:
"Before a request for discovery has been made, the duty
of disclosure is operative as a duty of preservation."
In Wright, the defendant point up several possibilities
for the use of evidence and the court held that by so doing, he
demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the evidence destroyed
by the police was material to guilt or innocence and favorable.
The court then went on vlith the more difficult task of
fashioning a remedy.

They noted there have been situations where

the prosecution has made "an earnest effort" to preserve the
materials, but noted this was not the case.

Even though the

evidence was not destroyed for the specific purpose of hindering
the defense, the motive of the prosecution or the police is not
determinative.

The purpose of the duty of preservation "is not

to punish the police, but to insure a fair trial for the accused."
The court noted the destruction was intentional as there was
no effort made to preserve the evidence and further noted that
neither "administrative convenience nor inadequate facilities
justifies a failure to preserve potential evidence."
the defendant was denied due process of law.

Therefore,

The court noted that

usually in a suppression type case a new trial can be ordered and thE
defendant can be given the supnressed evidence.

Of course,

that is not possible in this case, so the court saw no alternative
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other

went on to discuss some of the nractical problems that would be

then

be created for police and gave suggestions as how to handle that.
Defendant contends that his case is very much similar in that
the evidence was clearly intentionally abandoned even though there
is no contention made that it was done as a purpose to hinder defense.
Administrative ease is not a sufficient reason for denying evidence.
There is no possible way defendant can now show that the evidence
would have been favorable, but it clearly was material and it
might have been favorable.

Defendant contends this court should

follow the Wright rationale and hold that the destruction of such
endence denies defendant due process of law and dismiss the charges
against him.
In State v. Trimble, 402 P.2d 162 (N.M. 1965) the court
dealt with a destruction of evidence case much weaker than defendant's.
In that case the defendant, a minister, was convicted of First
Degree Murder.

It was defendant's theory at trial that he

acted in self defense.

He claimed to have in his possession a letter

and some tapes which he was about to show the victim \vhen the victim
attacked the defendant and necessitated the shooting.

After the

shooting the police obtained a search warrant and obtained the letter
and tapes and thereafter these were ~never seen again.

The defendant

claimed they were helpful to his defense of self defense in that they
l·lould have contained what he said they did and corroborated his
trial testimony.

The State argued that the existence of the

letter and the tape were explained by defendant on the stand and
his testimony was not contraverted and so there was not prejudice.
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to the suppression of favorable evidence by the State, although
not exactly alike.

The court went on to hold over the argument of

the State that even though the suppression was not willful,
the same rule applies.

The court noted that the presence and

existence of the letter and its' assistance to defendant in
corroborating his version were, "too apparent for argument."

Therefo:.

under the facts of the case, the court had no alternative, but to
reverse and set aside the sentence.
The situation in defendant's case is like the situation
brought to light in the California case of Peonle v. Hitch,
527 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1974).

In that case a person was convicted of

drivinR while under the influence of alcohol and the results of
a breathalyzer test were admitted at this trial.

The defendant

sought to analyze the test ampoules which had been used while
the breath test had been given by police officers. Those had been
destroyed after the test by the police officer.

California Court

began its' analysis and said that the results of such test
clearly constitute material evidence and went on to say that
evidence;
"Substantially affecting the aredibility of the
results of the test would appear to be material and
the suppression of such evidence would deny defendant
a fair trial."
They noted, of course, that the critical evidence was not before
them so it was not for the court to determine whether the
evidence was or was not favorable to the issue of the
defendant's guilt or innocence.

The court likened the
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Eo:

is known by the police on a drug sale, but the name is not
revealed for the defendant to locate and interview the witness.
The court noted that in those situations where the defendant has
shown a reasonable possibility that the informant could give
gavorable evidence his identity must be disclosed or the case
dismissed.

Similarly, the court in Hitch said that given the

availability of the test ampoule and its contents there is a
reasonable possibility that it would constitute favorable evidence
on the issue of guilt or innocence and if that is shown then such
evidence must be disclosed.
clearly must be disclosed.

If the evidence was available, it
The court in that case gave prospective

effect only to their rule because of the immensity of cases dealing
with a breathalyzer and test ampoules in California alone.

The

rule to be followed would be that the test results would be suppressed
on the part of the State if the evidence were not preserved and
discoverable by defense.
In fashioning a remedy defendant contends that the court
must weigh the significance of the lost or destroyed evidence
and the conduct which lead to that destruction.

Further, the court

should consider the ease or difficulty of retaining such evidence
~

in determining what remedy ought to apply.

The evidence and

materiality has already been discussed and is, as the court in
Trimble, said; "too apparent for argument."
of preservation of the evidence is apparent.

Similarly the case
There is simply no

justification for the failure to preserve this critical identification
evidence,
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the case law is clear that the showing of
photographic arrays is subject to the constitutional requirements
of due process of law.

The evidence which would have revealed that

clearly has been destroyed by the police who had custody of it.
The principles of due process mandate that in the absence of
the preservation of such evidence, dismissal of the case against
appellant is the only affective remedy.

Appellant therefore

requests that the case against him be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this ___ day of March, 1980.

BRADLEY P, RICH
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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